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The spokes model is a recent framework to study n-ﬁrms spatial
competition. In a spatial framework ﬁrms delivering their product can
price discriminate with respect to consumers’ location. Conditions for
the existence of a price-location equilibrium of the spokes model with
delivered product are established in both the case where there are
as many ﬁr m sa ss p o k e sa n di nt h ec a s en o ta l ls p o k e sa r eo c c u p i e d .
The equilibrium outcome may be interpreted as one ﬁrm supplying a
"general purpose product" while others focusing on their "niche".
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes endogenous location in the spokes model when ﬁrms are
allowed to price discriminate. It also establishes the existence and properties
of a price-location equilibrium in this context.
The spokes model is a theoretical framework to model non-localized spa-
tial competition between n ﬁrms. Firms and customers are located over
spokes of constant length which have a common centre. Consumers can buy
from whichever ﬁrm they like but if the ﬁrm is not located on their own
spoke, either the customer or the delivering ﬁrm has to travel through the
centre of the market. In this sense the spokes model can be seen as a natural
extension of Hotelling competition on a line, when there is a generic number
n of ﬁrms in the market. The spokes spatial conﬁguration has been recently
introduced in the literature on product diﬀerentiation by Chen-Riordan[3].
Two are the main contributions of Chen-Riordan’s paper: the ﬁrst is to prove
that in a limiting equilibrium as the number of spokes and ﬁrms tend to in-
ﬁnity the spokes model captures Chamberlin’s original idea of monopolistic
competition; the second is to highlight that strategic interaction in the spokes
model may imply price increasing competition. Although the features of the
spokes model may not perfectly match the ones of real world markets1,t h e
framework can be considered as an important theoretical alternative to the
circular city model model (Salop[17]) when the neighbouring eﬀects of com-
petition are not particularly relevant. The new but growing literature2 on
the spokes model has focused on price and entry choices of ﬁrms exogenously
1One notable exception may be the concrete sector (Syverson[18]). Concrete is pro-
duced by ﬁrms at several locations in the territory and it is usually shipped to ﬁnal users.
This market is often cited in discussions of spatial price discrimination (Phlips[16]) and of
the spokes model (Chen-Riordan[4]).
2The spokes model is used, between others, by Caminal-Claici[1] in the context of
loyalty rewarding schemes, by Caminal-Granero[2] to study the provision of quality by
multi-product ﬁrms, by Ganuza-Hauk[7] to address allocation of ideas in tournaments, by
Chen-Riordan[4] regarding vertical integration.
2located at the extreme of their own spoke.
Product delivery by ﬁrms is a very common assumption in the literature
on spatial pricing. The analysis of location-contingent pricing can be traced
back to Greenhut-Ohta[9] in the monopolistic case and Greenhut-Greenhut[8]
in an imperfectly competitive case. Perfect price discrimination is more likely
in a spatial setting than in most other market conﬁgurations, as ﬁrms can
easily get precise information on the address of the customers and deliver
them the products. As a consequence, there is an extensive literature on
optimal ﬁrms’ location and product delivery. Thisse-Vives[19] were the ﬁrst
to point out that in a spatial context competitive price discrimination makes
all ﬁrms worse oﬀ. While a monopolist can extract all of consumers’ rent by
discriminating with respect to location, in a duopoly with perfect informa-
tion ﬁrms will match the opponent’s oﬀer to a given customer located at a
generic point. Lederer-Hurter[14] establish the existence of a price-location
equilibrium in a duopolistic spatial framework. They prove under very gen-
eral assumptions that the proﬁt maximizing location chosen by ﬁrms corres-
pond to the socially optimal one. MacLeod-Norman-Thisse[15] consider an
n-ﬁrms spatial model and prove the existence of a price-location equilibrium
with free-entry. Their assumptions on the spatial conﬁguration is compatible
with a circular city model à la Salop. The conclusions are similar to the ones
of Lederer-Hurter[14], although free entry might determine a too large or a
too small number of varieties.
In this paper the topological structure of the spokes model is unmodi-
ﬁed but a diﬀerent game is considered. Firms are allowed to price discrim-
inate customers with respect to their location on the spokes by delivering
the product to the consumers’ address3. Endogenous location in an n ﬁrm
market with no neighbouring eﬀects is tackled. The game analyzed allows
3The opposite assumption of consumers traveling to the ﬁrm’s outlet would leave the
results unaﬀected (Vogel[20]). However, assumptions on perfect information and on the
impossibility of arbitrage may be less convincing in that case.
3customers to choose whichever brand/ﬁrm they like of the n existing on
the market. This feature is in sharp contrast with the spokes model with
uniform pricing: in that case tractability requires a given customer to have
positive demand for at most two brands. The analysis of this game allows to
shed light on a number of the issues discussed above. This paper not only
extends Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 in Lederer-Hurter[14] in the context of
n ﬁrms one-dimensional competition but also establishes the conditions for
the existence of a price-location equilibrium when the number of spokes is
greater than the number of ﬁrms on the market. The properties of this new
equilibrium are characterized, highlighting the diﬀerences with respect to the
benchmark case. As expected, full competition at each location still drives
down prices: this is reﬂected in a sharp decrease in ﬁrms’ proﬁts, as com-
pared to the uniform price case. The main result, however, is to prove that
when there exist parts of the markets not covered by ﬁrms, an asymmetric
outcome arises. One ﬁrm locates in the middle of the market, while the oth-
ers concentrate on serving their own spoke. This can be interpreted as one
ﬁrm supplying a sort of "general purpose" product while all others targeting
the market’s "niches". The multiplicity of equilibria is not occurring if one
of the ﬁr m sh a sac o s ta d v a n t a g e . I nt h a tc a s e ,t h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm is
the natural candidate for supplying the general purpose product. The social
optimality of product delivery in the short run seems robust to the presence
of n ﬁrms on the market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂyi n t r o -
duces the spokes model and its main features when ﬁrms are allowed to
price discriminate. Section 3 describes the game analyzed and provides the
main results. The existence and properties of a price-location equilibrium are
presented both for the case in which there are as many ﬁrms and spokes and
for the case in which the number of spokes is greater than the one of ﬁrms.
Mixed strategies are also considered. Section 4 concludes. Unless otherwise
stated, the proofs of all propositions can be found in the Appendix.
42 Price Discrimination in the Spokes Model
The market is described as a set of spokes with a common core. Each spoke
has a constant length which is normalized to ls =1 /2, s =1 ...N.T h e
market is constituted of a ﬁxed number of spokes N. Customers are distrib-
uted along each spoke according to a distribution function f(xs).W i t h o u t
loss of generality it will be assumed throughout the paper that customers
are uniformly distributed over the mar k e t ,s ot h a ta te a c hp o i n to fas p o k e
there is a density f(xs)=2 /N of customers; any non degenerate distribu-
tion function can be employed without aﬀecting the results4.E a c hc u s t o m e r
has a valuation v of each unit of the good. She demands one unit of the
good from ﬁrm i if: v − pi > 0.I fn oﬁrm can provide a positive utility the
customer stays out of the market: v − pi ≤ 0 ∀i =1 ...n: this possibility is
r u l e do u ta n di ti sa s s u m e dt h a tv is high enough for the market to be covered.
On the supply side, it is assumed that n ≤ N ﬁrms locate over the spokes.
Each spoke is occupied at most by one ﬁrm5:t h i sf e a t u r ei m p l i e st h a te a c h
ﬁrm has its own spoke but, if the inequality holds strictly, not on all spokes
there is a ﬁrm. The good supplied is ap r i o r ihomogeneous: the only source
of diﬀerentiation is given by the distance that separates the consumers from
the ﬁrm. Unlike Chen-Riordan [3], who introduced the spokes model, it is
not necessary to assume that each consumer has only one favourite brand
as an alternative to the one represented by his own spoke. Competition can
take place between all ﬁrms at the same time. The entry stage is overlooked:
assuming an exogenously given number of ﬁr m se n t e rt h em a r k e td o e sn o t
4The intuition for the result is the following: in computing both ﬁrms’ proﬁts and
social cost functions, each location has to be considered independently. This is due to
the assumption of product delivery, which allows ﬁrms to condition the price schedule to
consumers’ location. Local competition implies that the shape of the distribution function
aﬀects the optimal location but does not aﬀect the properties of it.
5This assumption is not strictly necessary: when n ≤ N it can be shown that no pair
of ﬁrms have incentive to locate on the same spoke.
5Figure 1: Spokes model with endogenous location with n =3and N =5 .
prevent to capture the main insights of the analysis. The focus of this paper is
on the location choice of ﬁrms. A generic ﬁrm i c a nl o c a t eo nw h a t e v e rp o i n t
of its spoke li which is denoted by yi. This feature implies that yi ∈ [0; 1/2]6.
As ﬁrms deliver their product to consumers, they are allowed to price
discriminate customers according to their location over the spokes. A generic
customer located on a spoke s is identiﬁed by x:c o n s u m e r si n x =0are
located at the extreme of the considered spoke while consumers at x =1 /2
are exactly at the center of the market. The location of each consumer,
however, is spoke dependent: a consumer is fully identiﬁed by xs although at
times it will be convenient to denote xf, f =1 ...n,f o rc o n s u m e r so ns p o k e s
occupied by ﬁrms and xe, e =1 ...N − n for consumers located on empty
spokes.
The assumptions stated imply that competition between ﬁrms takes place
for each individual customers at any speciﬁc given location. Figure 1 illus-
trates the spokes model in case two ﬁrms are located in the interior of their
6Chen-Riordan[3] and most of the following literature assumed that ﬁrms were all
located at the origin of each spoke, i.e. yi =0 ∀i =1 ..n.
6spoke while one is at the extreme. The two remaining spokes are not occu-
pied by ﬁrms, but consumers are uniformly distributed all over the spokes.
The topology of the spokes model is not trivial: for this reason a discussion
of the deﬁnition of distance is in order. The distance between ﬁrm i, located
at yi and the customer located at xs is deﬁned as d(yi,x s).T h e n o t i o n o f
distance, then, is also spokes-dependent. In particular, if the ﬁrm and the
customer are both located on the i- t hs p o k e ,t h e nd i s t a n c ec a nb ew r i t t e n
as:
d(yi,x s)=|yi − xs| s = i
But if the ﬁrm is located on a diﬀerent spoke with respect to customer x(l),













=1− yi − xs ∀s 6= i
as the ﬁr m sa l w a y sh a v et ot r a v e lt o w a r d st h ec e n t e ro ft h em a r k e tt od e l i v e r
the product to consumers located over diﬀerent segments.
Consistent with most of the literature on spatial price discrimination, it is
assumed that serving a customer has a cost which is proportional to distance:
t h eu n i tt r a n s p o r t a t i o nc o s ti si d e n t i c a lf o ra l lﬁrms and all customers and
is denoted by t.E a c h ﬁrm can produce the good through a technology
characterized by a unit and marginal cost of ci.
3 A Price-Location Equilibrium of the Spokes
Model
3.1 The Game
It is assumed that n ≤ N ﬁr m sh a v ee n t e r e dt h em a r k e t ,a st h ee n t r ys t a g e
is not explicitly modelled. The logical sequence of the game is as follows:
1. Nature has assigned to each of the n ﬁrm one and one only spoke,
between the N available.
72. Location choice: each ﬁrm chooses its location yi ∈ [0,1/2] on her
spoke;
3. Price choice: given the location yi,t h eﬁrm chooses the price schedule
pi(xs).
The game is solved by backward induction to identify strategies which are
undominated and constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium. The following
analysis closely parallels Lederer-Hurter[14], of which this game constitutes
a generalization.
3.2 The Price Equilibrium
Suppose for now that ﬁrms have announced their price schedule, given the
selected location yi over their own spoke: pi(xs|yi) ∀i =1 ...n.C u s t o m e r s
at location xs choose to buy from the ﬁrm providing the good at the lowest
price7.H a v i n gd e ﬁned X as the set of all possible locations over all N spokes,
the following partition of X from the point of view of ﬁrm i can be introduced:
Di(pi,p −i)={x ∈ X s.t.pi(x|yi) < min{p−i(x|y−i}}
DS(pi,p −i)={x ∈ X s.t.pi(x|yi)=m i n {p−i(x|y−i}}
The sets Di and DS can be interpreted as the segments of demand faced
by the i =1 ...n ﬁrms respectively and in which DS(pi,p −i) is the market
region shared by two or more ﬁrms. To complete the deﬁnition of the ﬁrms’
demand schedules a sharing rule is speciﬁed. This is needed to assign the
contended region of the market DS t oas p e c i ﬁc ﬁrm. Consistent with most of
the existing literature, a cost-advantage (or eﬃcient) sharing rule is adopted.
The implications and the role of this assumption are discussed in presenting
the results of the paper.
7When no ambiguity is possible, the notation x is used from now on instead of xs.
8Deﬁnition 1 A cost advantage sharing rule is a function r such that:
r(yi,p i,y −i,p −i,x)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if ci + td(yi,x) > min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}
ri if ci + td(yi,x)=m i n {c−i + td(y−i,x)}
1 if ci + td(yi,x) < min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}
ri ∈]0,1[ represents the random share in case parity persists, provided
that
P
i ri =1 . On the basis of the speciﬁed sharing rule, the set DS can be
partitioned in the subsets DSi = {x ∈ DS|ri =1 }, for which clearly holds
the following:
S
∀i DSi = DS.
The proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm i is then deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2 Given that customers are uniformly distributed over the N
spokes and that there exist a sharing rule r, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is:
π
r











[pi(x|yi) − td(yi,x) − ci]r(yi,p i,y −i,p −i,x)dx
In order to characterize the equilibrium price schedule, it is useful to
identify the boundaries which the ﬁrm faces in setting the price at a given
location. The two following remarks allow to characterize these boundaries.
Remark 1 Given the set of locations y =( y1,...,y i,...,yn) chosen by ﬁrms
at the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm i can not make losses in serving customer x:
pi(x|y) ≥ ci + td(yi,x) ∀x ∈ X
If this was not the case, from Deﬁnition 2 is clear that the customer x
would contribute negatively to proﬁts: this is not rational for the ﬁrm.
9Remark 2 Given the set of locations y =( y1,...,y i,...,yn) chosen by ﬁrms
at the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm i can not price the good delivered to customer x over
the reservation value:
pi(x|y) ≤ v ∀x ∈ X
A delivered price above the customers’ (known) reservation value would
n o to n l yi m p l yt h a tt h em a r k e tm a yn o tb ef u l l yc o v e r e db u ti ti sa l s o
privately irrational, as it would drive down to zero the chances of ﬁrm i
to serve customer x.
The following proposition characterizes the unique pure strategy equilibrium
of the second subgame:
Proposition 1 Given the set of locations y =( y1,...,yi,...,yn),t h eu n i q u e
equilibrium of the price subgame is:
p
∗
i(x|y)=m a x{ci + td(yi,x),min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}} ∀i =1 ...n (1)
The proposition establishes that the equilibrium price schedule is closely
linked to the cost structure. As a consequence of undercutting, the price at
a generic location x is either the ﬁrm’s cost of delivering the product or, if
the ﬁrms is the lowest cost provider, the cost of the ﬁrm that is the second
most eﬃcient in delivering the good.
3.3 The Location Equilibrium
The equilibrium price schedule identiﬁe db y( 1 )i m p l i e st h a tt h ep r o ﬁtf u n c -
tion for ﬁrm i can be written as:
π
r





min{c−i + td(y−i,x)} − (ci + td(yi,x))dx
The Nash equilibrium of the location subgame is deﬁned as:
y
∗








−i) ∀i =1 ...n
10Before proceeding to the characterization of the location sub-game equilib-
rium, it is worth noticing that two possible cases can arise in the spokes
model. The ﬁrst possibility is that ﬁrms occupy all of the existing spokes,
so that n = N:t h i si san-ﬁrm generalization of the Hotelling[12]-Hoover[11]
case. The second possible market structure is constituted by only n ﬁrms
entering the market, made up by N spokes as n<N.
3.3.1 Location equilibrium in the n = N case
In this section the existence and properties of equilibrium are analyzed in
case the number of ﬁrms on the market equals the number of spokes. In
order to characterize the equilibrium and its properties it is useful to deﬁne
social cost as:
Deﬁnition 3 The social cost is the total cost aﬀorded by ﬁrms to supply
the good to all customers on the market in a cooperative/cost minimizing









It is important to notice that social cost is a continuous function of y over
the support X. An important relation between proﬁts and social cost exists
and it is captured by the following expression:
π
r
























min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}dx − SC(y) (2)
Although this is a case in which algebra is far more clear than words, an
intuitive explanation of (2) is as follows: the proﬁts of a ﬁrm consist of two
11elements. The ﬁrst is positive and it is made in the region where the ﬁrm
i st h el o w e s tc o s tp r o v i d e r ,i no t h e rw o r d so nDi.I f t h e ﬁrm is the lowest
cost provider on a region, she concurs to the deﬁnition of social cost in that
region. On Di the proﬁts obtained are the diﬀerential between ﬁrm’s delivery
cost and the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm’s delivery cost, by (1). The other part
is constituted by the rest of the market X on which the ﬁrm is not the lowest
cost provider and, as such, does not contribute in computing the social cost
but it does not make any proﬁte i t h e r . P r o ﬁts, then, are deﬁned as the
diﬀerence, on all the market X,b e t w e e nt h el o w e s tc o s tr i v a la n dt h es o c i a l
cost, which in region Di is just ﬁrm’s cost while out of Di is nothing but
the lowest cost rival. Relation (2) allows to establish the following important
results.
Proposition 2 A price-location equilibrium exists in the spokes model
with delivered products and n = N.
Once established the existence of equilibrium, Proposition 3 outlines the
properties of this case.
Proposition 3 The vector y =( y∗
1,..,y∗
i,..,y∗
n) is an equilibrium of the







−i) ∀yi ∈ X ∀i =1 ...n (3)
and equilibrium price policies (1) are used by all ﬁrms.
The results provided establish that a price-location equilibrium exists in
the spokes model when n = N. The most important feature is to show that
t h el o c a t i o nc h o s e ni no r d e rt om a x i m i z eﬁrms proﬁts is also minimizing the
sum of transportation costs, i.e. it is socially optimal. The result can be inter-
preted as follows: the competitive pressure between ﬁrms takes prices down
to cost; given that a cost-advantage sharing rule is adopted, then proﬁts are
maximized at the location which is also minimizing the joint cost of serving
12the market. This result constitutes an extension of Lederer-Hurter[14], The-
orem 3, to the case of n ﬁrms. Propositions 2 and 3 imply that their ﬁndings
are robust in the spokes model: despite the gains from possible deviations
are multiplied by (n − 1) in this setting, these are yet not proﬁtable and an
equilibrium exists. For completeness, it has to be stressed that this result is
a tt h es a m et i m eas p e c i a lc a s eo fT h e o r e m3i nL e d e r e r - H u r t e r [ 1 4 ]a st h e
location space in the spokes model is one-dimensional: a corollary is that the
equilibrium location vector y is also globally cost minimizing and, given the
price schedule, it corresponds to the location proﬁle chosen by a multi-plant
monopolist.
Finally, notice the following corollary of the general result obtained.
Remark 3 If all ﬁrms are symmetric, the competitive and socially optimal
l o c a t i o ni ti sj u s ta tt h eh a l fo fe a c hﬁrms’ spoke, i.e. y∗ =ˆ y = 1
4.
As opposed to the next case (n<N), in this setting symmetry between
ﬁrms implies a symmetric outcome of the game.
3.3.2 Location equilibrium in the spokes model when n<N
In this section it is maintained that there is an exogenous number of ﬁrms n in
the market. This number, however, is smaller than the number of spokes N.
In such a setting the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the price sub-game is
still described in Proposition 1. The intuition is as follows. A cost advantage
s h a r i n gr u l ea si nD e ﬁnition 1 is adopted. For all occupied spokes, the lowest
cost ﬁrm prices at the delivered cost of the second most eﬃcient competitor.
For non-occupied spokes, if there exist a ﬁrm with a cost advantage, she cap-
tures all the customers by pricing at the most eﬃcient rival’s delivered cost; if
t h e r ei sn o tam o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm, all competitors price equally at the common
delivered cost. The equilibrium price schedules are then still described by (1).
13Turning to the location sub-game, the following strategy is used to prove
the existence of the equilibrium and to characterize it. First, it is ruled out
t h a tt h eo u t c o m eo ft h eg a m ei ss y m m e t r i c :t h i si st r u ei nc a s ea l lﬁrms are a
priori identical too. Second, an asymmetric equilibrium outcome is proved to
exist and characterized. Finally, a mixed strategy equibrium of the location
game is analyzed.
Non Existence of Symmetric Outcomes The main diﬀerence between
this case and the previous one, in in which n = N, is the presence of empty
spokes. The consumers on empty parts of the market do not have an ap r i o r i
favourite ﬁrm and the remaining ﬁrms on the market start from even ground
when trying to attract them to purchase their product. This feature aﬀects
the competitive forces in operation and has an impact on the outcome of the
game.
Suppose that all ﬁrms produce with the same technology (i.e. ci = c
∀i =1 ..n) : in other words all ﬁrms are symmetric in every respect. In such
a situation, it is interesting to ask whether a symmetric equilibrium of the
game exists.
Suppose all ﬁrms are perfectly symmetric and so are their strategy choices,
the following non-existence result can then be established:
Proposition 4 Assume that all ﬁrms are symmetric and the equilibrium
price policies (1) are employed, then a symmetric pure strategy equi-
librium of the location subgame does not exist in the spokes model with
delivered product as n<N.
Proposition 4 establishes the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
in the location subgame spokes model with delivered product when n<N .
The intuition for this result is the following: suppose ﬁrst that the centre,
where all the spokes join, is the symmetric equilibrium location of all ﬁrms.
In that case, ﬁrms obtain no proﬁt and they have a strictly positive unilateral
14incentive to deviate to a location internal to their own spokes. However, as
the equilibrium location is a vector of points internal to the spokes, then it
can be shown that a ﬁrm faces a unilateral incentive to move towards the
centre to undercut all competitors and serve a larger share of the market.
This implies that no equilibrium conﬁguration exists when all ﬁrms are sym-
metric.
Equilibrium Outcomes Consider then asymmetric equilibrium outcomes.
Before addressing the case of technologically symmetric ﬁrms, it is conveni-
ent to establish the existence and properties of the equilibrium in the more
general case. Then, conditions under which a pure strategy price-location
equilibrium with symmetric ﬁrms of the spokes model exists and n<Nare
provided. It turns out that a small amount of asymmetry between ﬁrms is
enough to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. The next proposition
also characterizes the equilibrium conﬁguration.
Proposition 5 Assume the equilibrium price policies (1) are employed. If
ci < min∀j6=i{cj},t h e napure strategy equilibrium of the location subgame
exists in the spokes model with delivered product as n<N . Moreover, the















Proposition 5 implies that in order to have a pure strategy equilibrium
it is suﬃcient that there exist a lowest cost ﬁrm diﬀering from all others,
which can still be symmetric. The intuition for this result goes as follows.
First, ﬁrms do not have an incentive to locate at the centre of the market,
otherwise all but the lowest cost ﬁrm would get zero proﬁts. They can instead
get strictly positive proﬁts by locating in the interior of their spoke. In
that case, it can be veriﬁed that the lowest cost ﬁrm has an incentive to
15increase her location as much as possible. This tendency ﬁnds a limit at the
centre, which is the location chosen by the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. She targets
all segments of the market which do not have a favourite brand and captures
them all by locating at the middle. Incidentally, this implies also serving her
own consumers and some consumers located on rivals’ spokes. Other ﬁrms,
instead, maximize their proﬁts by "specializing", i.e. serving only part of
their own spokes. It is also worth noting that the optimal location of a given
ﬁrm is independent of the number of ﬁrms, the number of spokes and the
costs of other less eﬃcient ﬁrms. To conclude, a small amount of asymmetry
allows ﬁrms to coordinate and a competitive equilibrium to exist: this can be
interpreted as if the eﬃcient ﬁrm is supplying a "general purpose" product
while other ﬁrms focus on "niches" of the market.
Once determined the existence of the equilibrium and characterized the
optimal locations in case ﬁrms are not perfectly symmetric, it is interesting
to see how these compare with the social optimal location conﬁguration.
Proposition 6 Suppose ci < min∀j6=i{cj} , then the vector of locations ˆ y











in the spokes model with delivery when n<N.
Social cost is minimized when the most eﬃcient ﬁrm locates at the centre
of the market. The social cost decreases as she increases her location but the
centre where all spokes join provides her with a limit to that expansion. Cost
minimization, then, clearly, implies all other ﬁrms to choose a location in the
interior of their spokes. The last step is to provide the comparison of the
socially optimal location with the competitive equilibrium in the asymmetric
case. From Proposition 5 and 6 is clear that the optimal choice of both
types of ﬁrms (lowest marginal cost and not) coincide with the locations
that minimize social cost. The results of Lederer-Hurter[14] are robust to
16the existence of regions of the market where no ﬁrm locates, provided that
the ﬁrms can choose an asymmetric locations’ conﬁguration. These results
are summarized in the following proposition, stated without proof as it is
straightforward:
Proposition 7 In the spokes model with delivery if n<Nand ci <
min∀j6=i{cj}, the degree of diﬀerentiation is socially optimal.
After the more general case with asymmetric marginal costs, it is really
straightforward to characterize the case in which all ﬁrms have access to the
same technology. Despite the symmetry of cost, the locational outcome is
asymmetric. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Suppose ci = c ∀i =1 ...n and assume the equilibrium price
policies (1) are employed, then an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium
of the location subgame exists in the spokes model with delivered product
as n<N . Moreover, in the spokes model with delivery when n<N ,t h e








The vector of locations ˆ y coincides with the socially optimal locations’ vector.
The symmetric case is then simply a special case of the asymmetric one
and shares most properties with it: in particular, the (asymmetric) equilib-
rium outcome is socially optimal. However, a further observation is in order.
The existence of areas of the markets over which no ﬁrm has a cost advantage
implies that the equilibrium location conﬁguration is asymmetric even if all
ﬁrms are perfectly identical. As mentioned above, this can be interpreted in
terms of one ﬁrm supplying a "general purpose" product while all other spe-
cialize on their segment of the market. In this case, however, it is not ex-ante
possible to predict which ﬁrm i will supply the generic product. There are
in fact n possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. This implies that ap r i o r iit is
17not possible to forecast which parts of the market will experience specializ-
ation and which others will not and, from the point of view of a regulator,
coordination-type of problems may arise.
An intuitive explanation of these results may be provided by MacLeod-
Norman-Thisse[15]. In standard spatial models in which consumers travel
to the outlet and buy the product, transportation costs can be thought as a
measure of disutility and location is a product characteristic. In presence of
product delivery, instead, the situation can be interpreted as ﬁrms trying to
personalize and adapt their products to the demand expressed by consumers.
The results presented can be seen as an explanation why some ﬁrms produ-
cing to order are specializing in a very specialized range of items while other
supply a wider product line. A possible example is provided by taylor-made
clothes or made to order shoes: traditional hand-crafting laboratories usually
specialize on a very limited range of products. Large multinational compan-
ies, favoured by the recent developments in internet-based shopping, allow
consumers to personalize their product by choosing between a wide number
of characteristics and items.
Figure 2 illustrates the location equilibrium in case n =4ﬁrms are on a
market composed of N =5spokes. In the same example, the equilibrium
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while for the ﬁrm located at the centre is:
18Figure 2: Equilibrium location conﬁguration as n<N,w i t hn =4symmetric
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assuming c =0 .2 and t =0 .8.
3.3.3 Mixed Strategy Equilibria of the Location Game
The price-location game studied has n pure strategy equilibria and coordin-
ation failures may arise. In such a setting it is of interest to consider also
the mixed strategy equilibria of the game. Mixed strategy equilibria have
an intutive appeal: the probability distribution obtained can be interpreted
as a prediction on the location pattern in a market with a geographical or
19characteristics structure as the spokes model. The question is whether this
location pattern is socially optimal or not.
Before turning to the mixed strategies equilibrium, the socially optimal
location conﬁguration has to be considered. Consider symmetric ﬁrms: the
social optimum is characterized then by the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 Suppose all ﬁrms are symmetric. The vector of locations ˆ y
that minimizes the sum of the costs of delivery is given by:
ˆ yi =
n2 + N − n
4n2 ∀i =1 ..n
in the spokes model with delivery when n<N.
It can be noticed that as the number of empty spokes N − n increases,
the social cost minimizing location shifts towards the centre of the market.
In fact, when the all spokes are occupied and ﬁrms are all identical it is
easily checked that the social minimizing location corresponds to yi = 1
4
for all ﬁrms. However, when there are empty spokes the numerator in the
expression above increases and the optimal location is yi > 1
4.I n c a s e t h e
number of empty spokes is particularly large (i.e. if N − n ≥ n2), then
minimum diﬀerentiation ˆ y = 1
2 is the socially optimal choice.
Proposition 10 characterizes the mixed strategy equilibrium of the spokes
model as n<Nin the simplest case: n =2and N =3 .
Proposition 10 The equilibrium price policies (1) are employed. If n =2
and N =3and both ﬁrms choose absolutely continuous distribution functions
with a connected support, then the spokes model with delivered product has a



















20Figure 3: Joint Cumulative Distribution Function of the Mixed Strategy
Equilibrium.






where erf(.) denotes the error function. Figure 3 plots the joint cumu-
lative distribution function obtained. The characteristics of the distribution
function characterizing the mixed strategy equilibrium are reported in Table
1. It can be noticed that both the expected and the median location imply
a slightly larger degree of diﬀerentiation with respect to the case in which
the number of spokes is identical to the number of ﬁrms participating in the
market. More interestingly, however, the mean and the median locations can
be compared with the socially optimal location. The following result can be
stated8:
8This result is reported without proof as it follows directly from the expressions previ-
ously reported.
21Proposition 11 In the spokes model with n =2and N =3 ,t h ee x p e c t e d
location of the MSNE of the game (E(yi)=0 .2299) implies a sub-optimal
excess diﬀerentiation with respect to the social cost minimizing conﬁguration
(ˆ yi =0 .3125).
The failure of ﬁrms to coordinate when competing for the empty spokes
implies two types of ineﬃciencies in their location choices. First, by deﬁnition
a mixed strategy equilibrium involves uncertainty on the location of the ﬁrms.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium outlined for the special case considered,
the volatility of the location choice, as measured by the standard deviation,
is 0.14. A further source of ineﬃciency is linked to the discrepancy between
social optimality and the expected value of location under the mixed strategy.
The example considered seems to suggest that ﬁrms are expected to choose
an amount of diﬀerentiation superior to what would be socially optimal.
The interpretation for this result is that ﬁerce competition for the empty
spokes makes them less proﬁtable in expectation; this is suggesting ﬁrms to
be conservative and focus relatively more on their own market turf.
This result may have an interesting empirical implication and help explain
the spread of ﬁrms around the center of a market. Given the strong assump-
tions adopted, this interpretation can not be overemphasized; however, the
conclusion may provide a key to understand a pattern often observed in
urban industrial development. Industrial ﬁrms usually tend to deliver their
products to ﬁnal retailers or consumers. In urban agglomerates groups of
ﬁrms tend to cluster in districts closer to the periphery than the centre of
the market.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper establishes the existence and the properties of the equilibria of
the spokes model when ﬁrms are in charge of delivering their product to
22customers and they can practice perfect price discrimination with respect to
consumers location.
T h em a i nr e s u l t so ft h ep a pe ra r et h ef o llowing: Lederer-Hurter[14] provide
an important existence result and the characterization of the equilibrium in
a spatial duopoly with delivery. This paper generalizes their analysis to the
spokes model. The robustness of their results is conﬁrmed in a n ﬁrms spatial
context which is a direct generalization of the Hotelling linear market. Com-
petition drives prices down to delivered costs. Location choice corresponds
to the social optimum, no matter if ﬁrms locate on all spokes or not. In case
all spokes are occupied there is an obvious and intuitive relation between
proﬁt maximization and social cost minimization. This is driving the op-
timality result on location. In case there are empty spokes, instead, it is
shown that the only possible equilibrium conﬁguration involves asymmetric
locations. If ﬁrms are not totally symmetric, the result can be interpreted as
follows: ﬁrms optimally coordinate so that the most eﬃcient provides a "gen-
eral purpose" product, that can be diﬀerentiated for targeting the regions of
the market which are not covered by rivals. All other ﬁrms concentrate on
their own "niche". However, if all ﬁrms are symmetric, a coordination prob-
lem arises: it is not possible ap r i o r ito know which ﬁrm will serve a wider
market by serving the generic product as n asymmetric equilibrium location
conﬁgurations exist. Finally, an atomless mixed strategy with connected
support is considered. The distribution function obtained as an equilibrium
can be interpreted as a possible equilibrium location pattern. In that case,
it is found that the average location displays a socially suboptimal excess of
diﬀerentiation.
These results provide a contribution to two diﬀerent streams of literature.
First, the theory of horizontal product diﬀerentiation and, in particular, on
the recently introduced spokes model. It is shown that if ﬁrms deliver their
product a fully competitive equilibrium of the model exists. The result is
in sharp contrast with the standard version of the spokes model, in which
23ﬁrms charge a uniform price: in that setting, tractability requires consumers
to have preferences for only two varieties of the product and not for all.
Moreover, for the ﬁrst time the location issue is addressed within the spokes
model.
Second, the results shed new light on optimal ﬁrm location under delivered
product. The existence of an equilibrium in the spokes model not only con-
stitutes a generalization of the results of Lederer-Hurter[14] to the case of n
ﬁr m s . T h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h en u m b e ro fﬁr m si sl o w e rt h a nt h en u m b e ro f
spokes displays interesting features. The distinguishing characteristic of the
equilibrium when the number of ﬁrms is identical to the number of spokes
is that location choice coincides in case ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers and in
case they aim at social cost minimization. This important and desirable
result holds also in case empty spokes exist. The resulting equilibrium loca-
tion conﬁguration, however, is now asymmetric: one ﬁrm supplies a "general
purpose" product targeting the empty spokes while all other focus on their
own "niches". The previous interpretation can be related to the literature
on general purpose products. In contrast with the existing literature9,t h e
spokes model with product delivery generates "endogenously" an equilibrium
conﬁguration characterized by a general purpose product and niches.
Three extensions are worth exploring in the future. First, the results ob-
tained imply that only one ﬁrm produces the general product. An interesting
development would be to ﬁnd conditions under which one or more ﬁrms opt
for a general purpose product while other focus on targeted ones.
A second extension of this research is to ﬁnd conditions under which a
location equilibrium can be found in the spokes model with mill prcing. This
case is absolutely technically challenging. However, it would be interesting
to address the impact of non covered segments of the market on optimal
9The seminal paper on general purpose products is Von Ungern Sternberg[21]. Fur-
ther results have been provided then by Hendel-Neiva de Figuereido[10] and Doraszelski-
Draganska[6].
24location of ﬁrms also in that case.
Finally, the theory developed delivers important empirical predictions.
It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd geographical markets in which ﬁrms deliver their
product. More challenging is to ﬁnd markets whose characteristics are fully
captured by the spokes model. The model, however, can be adapted to test
the predictions on of the theory on optimal location.
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27A Appendix
The Appendix contains the proofs of all the propositions stated in the text
apart from Proposition 7, 8 and 11.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Remarks 1 and 2 have ruled out all possible prices not included in the fol-
lowing subset:
pi(x|y) ∈ [ci + td(yi,x),v]
For a given y, having assumed a cost advantage sharing rule r ﬁrm i can
match any oﬀer of a rival ﬁrm j as long as she is the most eﬃcient in serving
customer x.
To begin with, consider ﬁrm i. First the claim for which, in equilibrium,
the price p∗
i(x|y) is identical for all ﬁrms i =1 ...n.H a v i n g d e ﬁned above:
DSi = {x ∈ DS|ri =1 } the subset of the market region DS in which ﬁrm i
has a cost advantage. Then, assuming ad absurdum that:
∀x ∈ DSi,p i(x|y) − pj(x|y)= >0,j6= i
then ﬁrm i loses all the customers located in x. On the other hand, proceeding
again ad absurdum:
∀x ∈ DSi,p j(x|y) − pi(x|y)= >0,j6= i
then ﬁrm i can raise its price and increase the proﬁt margin on customers
located at x. Then, the only possibility left is that: pi(x|y)=pj(x|y).T h e
reasoning can be repeated for all j 6= i and for all i =1 ...n.
Second, p∗
i(x|y)=m a x {ci + td(yi,x),min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}}.S u p p o s e i n -
stead that, for x ∈ DSi, the following holds:
p
∗
i(x|y) − max{ci + td(yi,x),min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}} =  >0
28In that case, the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm, say j, can choose the price
pj(x|y)=p∗
i −ξ and for suﬃciently small ξ raise its proﬁt, which contradicts
the deﬁnition of equilibrium. The reasoning can be repeated for all j 6= i,a l l
i =1 ...n.
Analogous reasoning allows to establish the result for the subsets of X over
which ri = r and ri =0 . Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As the strategy space Xi is non empty, convex and compact, then it is suﬃ-
c i e n tt os h o wt h a tt h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o n
π
r





min{c−i + td(y−i,x)} − (ci + td(yi,x))dx
is continuous and quasi-concave in yi so that the classical existence results
by Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan10 can be applied. This is done in what follows:
• Continuity in (yi,y −i) The expression of proﬁts in this case is:
π
r







{cj + td(yj,x)} − (ci + td(yi,x))dx
This can be rearranged as follows:
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(1 − yj + yi)
is the indiﬀerent consumers between ﬁrm i and j, the lowest cost ﬁrm
between the rivals. All the functions involved are continuous. All the
transformations required to compute the proﬁt functions (integration,
multiplication, addition and subtraction) are preserving continuity.
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ci + t(x − yi)dx
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ci + t(yi − x)dx +
Z x∗
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{cj + t(1 − x − yj}dx −
Z 1/2
1−x∗
ci + t(1 − x − yi)dx
#)
in case x∗ > 1/2.
As all the functions involved in the computation of the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
30in the two diﬀerent scenarios are continuous, then the only possible
discontinuity may take place when yi and yj are such that a shift takes
place from x∗ < 1/2 to x∗ > 1/2.D e ﬁne:
yi : {yi ∈ [0,1/2]|x
∗(yi,y j)=1 /2}
and
y−i : {yj ∈ [0,1/2]|x
∗(yi,y j)=1 /2}








cjt2 − cit2 − 4cjt +4 cit +2 t2 − 8c2
j +1 6 cjci +1 6 cjyjt − 8c2
i − 16ciyjt − 8y2
jt2
4Nt2
As the limits are identical for all values of yj, then it can be concluded
that the proﬁt function is continuous for all values of yi. A similar
reasoning can be applied to verify continuity with respect to y−i,w h i c h
in fact requires continuity only in yj, the location of the lowest cost
rival. Computing the following limits:
LD−i = limy−i→y−
−iπi(yi,y −i)=





cjt − cit +2 t − 4cj +4 ci − 8y2
it
4Nt
it is easy to verify they are identical. This allows to conclude the
proﬁt function is also continuous in y−i. The reasoning can then be
repeated for the proﬁt functions of all other n − 1 ﬁrms, obtaining an
identical result. This is implying that the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sc o n t i n u o u s
with respect to both yi and yj for yi ∈ [0,1/2] yj ∈ [0,1/2] in all the
possible cases: x∗ < 1
2, x∗ > 1
2 and x∗ = 1
2 and ∀j 6= i.
• Quasi-Concavity in yi
Using expression (2), the proﬁts can be written as:
31π
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min{c−i + td(y−i,x)}dx − SC(y)
All the term in expression but social cost are independent of yi.I no r d e r
to show that the proﬁt function is quasi-concave in yi it is suﬃcient to
show that the social cost function is quasi-convex in yi. The social cost





As all the functions are continuous, quasi-convexity can be checked by
computing the second derivative and verifying it has a positive sign.
Again three cases need to be considered. The second derivative of the









2N if x∗ < 1/2
4t
N if x∗ =1 /2
9t
2N if x∗ > 1/2
which is clearly positive in all cases, then social cost is quasi-convex.
This proves the quasi-concavity of πi with respect to yi.
These results, in conjunction with Proposition 1, prove the claim: a price
location equilibrium of the spokes model exists as n = N. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
If y =( y∗
1,..,y∗
i,..,y∗



















−i) ∀yi ∈ X ∀i =1 ...n

















from which (3) follows immediately.
If instead y =( y∗
1,..,y∗
i,..,y∗
n) satisﬁes (3) and the equilibrium price schedule




is a price-location equilibrium of the spokes model when n = N. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose ﬁrst that the vector of equilibrium locations is y∗ =( 1
2,..., 1
2), i.e.
the centre of the market. In this case all ﬁrms obtain zero proﬁts, as no one
has cost advantage in delivering the product:
c + td(x,y
∗
i)=m i n {c + td(x,y
∗
−i)} ∀ x ∈ X
which is implying that:
pi(x|y)=c + td(x,y
∗
i) ∀ x ∈ X
so that πr
i =0∀i =1 ..n.H o w e v e r ,t h i si m p l i e st h a te a c hﬁrm has a private
unilateral incentive to deviate from y∗
i = 1
2 and choose a location internal to
her own spoke yi ∈ [0, 1








j)} ∀ x ∈ Di
where Di, the market served by ﬁrm i, is now constituted by consumers on
her own spoke with a location such that i faces the lowest cost in delivering
to them, i.e. Di = {x ∈ Xi|x ∈ [0, 1
2 − δ
2]}. This implies that ﬁrm i makes a










j)} − [c + td(x,y
∗
i − δ)]dx > 0
This proves that ﬁrms have a unilateral incentive to deviate, contradicting
the deﬁnition of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then y∗ =( 1
2,...,1
2) can
not be an equilibrium.
Suppose, then, the equilibrium vector y∗ is such that y∗
i ∈ [0, 1
2[ ∀i =1 ..n.












j)} − [c + td(x,y
∗
i)]dx
If vector y∗ were to be the equilibrium, ﬁrms should not have an incentive to
deviate. However, suppose ﬁrm i moves in the direction of the centre of the
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Substituting the correct expressions for the distance and after the appropriate


















i − 2+2 ( N − n)+δ(n − 1)]
As N − n>0 and n − 1 ≥ 0 it follows that ∆πr
i(y∗,δ) > 0 ∀y∗ ∈ [0, 1
2[.
This implies for all possible symmetric equilibrium conﬁguration ﬁrms have
an unilateral incentive to deviate. This contradicts the deﬁnition of pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose ﬁrst that the equilibrium conﬁguration is yi = yj = 1
2 for all ﬁrms
j 6= i where i represents the lowest marginal cost ﬁrm. In that case, the













































i.e. all but the most eﬃcient ﬁrm get zero proﬁts. This implies that,
provided that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm chooses yi = 1
2,a l lo t h e rﬁrm choose
a location belonging to the interior of their spoke. This implies the game





















































1 − yi + yj
2
represents the consumer on j-th spoke which is indiﬀerent between ﬁrm j
and ﬁrm i. Were the maximization unconstrained, ﬁrm i had an incentive to










2N − (n +3 )
2(n − 1)
− yj > 0
36implying, that under our assumptions on N>n , cj >c i and yj ∈ [0, 1
2],t h e
optimal choice for the most eﬃcient ﬁrm must be y∗
i = 1
2.T h i si m p l i e st h a t









(ci − cj) ∀j 6= i
Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6







































[ci + t(1 − yi − x)]dx










The unconstrained maximization would suggest that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
i should choose location yi > 1
2. This can be shown by verifying that, under
t h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d eo nn<N, ci and cj:
∂SC(yi,y j)
∂yi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯yi=1










37holding for all possible yj ∈ [0, 1
2]. If the constraint for the location of ﬁrm
i is binding, then the social cost minimization problem implies an internal





















(ci − cj) ∀j 6= i
Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9






































from which is easily found that:
ˆ yi =a r gm i n
yi
{SC(y1...yn)} =
n2 + N − n
4n2 ∀i =1 ..n
Q.E.D.
38A.8 Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose that the opponent ﬁrm j has chosen the strategy f(yj).A t a n y










i(yi >y j)f(yj)dyj = C


























[c + td(x,yj) − c + td(x,yi)]dx
After computing the expressions for the proﬁts in the two cases, the condition



















j − 2yiyj +2 yi − 2yj +1 ] f(yj)dyj = C
39Diﬀerentiating with respect to yi yields:
(−4y
2









(2 − 6yi − 2yj)f(yj)dyj =0
Observe that β can only be equal to 1
2.S u p p o s eβ<1
2, this would imply that
ﬁrm i choose the centre of the market with probability zero: in that case the
opponent ﬁrm would have an incentive to locate exactly at the centre and
earn a strictly positive proﬁts. This leads to:
f(yi)+6(1−yi)F(yi)−2F(yi)(1−yi)−1−(2−6yi)F(yi)+1+2(yi−1)F(yi)=0





















I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h eo n l yα compatible with such a requirement are
α =0and so the distribution function is:
f(yi)=
2
erf{
√
2
2 }
r
2
π
e
−2y2
i ∀yi ∈
∙
0,
1
2
¸
∀i =1 ..n
Q.E.D.
40